Parking payments have moved onto the web. Drivers scan a QR code on a sign, open a payment page in their phone’s browser, enter a plate and pay. Monthly parkers manage permits in a customer portal. Event and airport customers prebook online. Each of those flows has a payment page, and each payment page loads JavaScript, which is exactly what web-skimming attacks target. PCI DSS 4.0.1 addresses this with two requirements, 6.4.3 and 11.6.1, which became mandatory on March 31, 2025, after being future-dated in the 4.0 release.

This article explains what the two requirements say, how they interact with the SAQ A changes, and what a parking operator should do in practice. It is not a substitute for your acquirer’s guidance or your QSA’s assessment.

Why scripts on payment pages matter

Web skimming, often called Magecart-style attacks, injects malicious JavaScript into a page where card data is entered, or into a third-party script the page loads. The code copies card data as the customer types and sends it elsewhere. The payment itself completes normally, so neither the customer nor the operator notices until fraud reports come in.

Parking payment pages are attractive targets for the same reasons they are convenient: they are public, they are reached from QR codes and links that are hard for drivers to verify, and they often load analytics, tag managers, chat widgets and mapping libraries alongside the payment form. Every one of those scripts runs with access to the page. Our article on QR code payment adoption covers the wider QR risk picture.

What 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 require

Requirement 6.4.3: control the scripts

All scripts loaded and executed on the payment page in the consumer’s browser must be managed as follows:

  • Authorized: there is a method to confirm each script is approved to run.
  • Integrity assured: there is a method to confirm each script has not been altered, such as subresource integrity hashes for static scripts or a content security policy restricting where scripts may load from.
  • Inventoried: a written inventory lists every script, with a business or technical justification for why it is needed.

The practical effect is that “the marketing team added a tag” is no longer an acceptable way for code to reach a payment page.

Requirement 11.6.1: detect changes

A change- and tamper-detection mechanism must alert personnel to unauthorized modification of the security-impacting HTTP headers and the script contents of payment pages, as received by the consumer’s browser. It must run at least weekly, or at a frequency set by your targeted risk analysis.

“As received by the consumer’s browser” is the key phrase. Checking your source repository is not enough, because attacks often modify what is served, or a third-party script changes upstream without any change in your code.

In March 2025 the PCI Security Standards Council published an information supplement, Guidance for PCI DSS Requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1, describing acceptable approaches. It is worth reading alongside the standard.

The SAQ A change and what it means for you

Many parking operators validate with SAQ A because their payment pages embed a processor’s hosted fields or iframe, or redirect to a processor-hosted page. In January 2025 the Council revised SAQ A: requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 (along with 12.3.1) were removed from the questionnaire and replaced with an eligibility criterion. To use SAQ A, the merchant must confirm its site is not susceptible to attacks from scripts that could affect its e-commerce systems.

PCI SSC FAQ 1588, published in February 2025, describes two ways to meet that criterion:

  1. Use techniques such as those in 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 to protect the page that hosts the payment iframe or redirect from scripts that target account data.
  2. Obtain confirmation from a PCI DSS-compliant third-party service provider or payment processor that its solution includes techniques protecting the payment page from script attacks.

The second option depends on your provider actually offering that assurance for your page, which many cannot do because they do not control the parent page. For most operators, the realistic path is the first one. Either way, the questions of what scripts run on your pages and whether anyone would notice a change do not go away under SAQ A.

Merchants that validate with SAQ D or undergo an onsite assessment still have 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 as full requirements.

Where the requirements apply in parking flows

Map every place a customer enters or is redirected to enter card data:

  • QR and web pay pages for on-street and lot payment.
  • Reservation and prebooking sites for airports, events and venues.
  • Monthly parker and permit portals where cards are stored or updated.
  • Citation payment pages, which are often run by a different vendor from the parking payment flow.
  • Hosted pages inside apps. Native apps that use a processor’s mobile SDK are assessed differently from browser pages, but many parking apps open a web view for the payment step. A web view loading a payment page is still a payment page.

For each, record who hosts it. Pages hosted entirely by your processor or a PCI-compliant parking platform are largely their responsibility, but you should hold their attestation of compliance and confirm it covers the service you use. Pages you or your web agency host, including pages that embed a processor iframe, are yours. Our article on cardholder data environment scoping covers how to draw those lines.

What to do now

  1. Inventory the pages. List every payment and payment-hosting page, its URL, owner and hosting provider.
  2. Inventory the scripts. For each page, list every script that loads, including scripts loaded by other scripts. Browser developer tools or a crawler will show what actually loads, which may differ from what developers think loads.
  3. Remove what is not needed. Analytics, heatmaps, chat and advertising tags rarely belong on the payment step. Removing them shrinks both risk and documentation.
  4. Lock down what stays. Apply a content security policy restricting script sources, use subresource integrity where scripts are static, and document an approval process for adding or changing scripts.
  5. Deploy change detection. Use a client-side monitoring service, a synthetic browser that checks pages and headers on a schedule, or CSP violation reporting with alerting. Make sure alerts reach someone who will act on them.
  6. Get vendor evidence. Ask each parking payment vendor for its current attestation of compliance and how it handles script integrity on pages it hosts for you.
  7. Confirm your SAQ. Check with your acquirer which validation path you are on, and whether your evidence supports the SAQ A eligibility criterion.

The requirements are now part of normal compliance, not a future date. The effort is mostly in knowing your pages and their scripts; once that inventory exists, keeping it current is a modest ongoing task. For the broader context, see our overview of PCI DSS 4.0 for parking operators.